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When the North Dakota Law Review approached me to write a
tribute to Justice Blackmun, I thought that, given my own background
and interests,1 an appropriate topic would deal with Justice Blackmun
and corporate, securities, or financial institutions law. 2 Work on this
topic might complement the writings on Justice Blackmun that appeared
before and after his retirement. Many of these writings have focused
upon Roe v. Wade,3 a decision that, for better or for worse, constitutes
Justice Blackmun's main judicial legacy. 4 When abortion rights are not
linked to Justice Blackmun, he is generally tied to other, equally contro-
versial social issues or marginal groups.5
* Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; B.A., University of Notre Dame, 1973;
M.A., University of Michigan, 1975; J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1985; Ph.D., University of
Michigan, 1988. The Author was a law clerk to Justice Blackmun for the 1986 Term. The Author
wishes to thank Professor Norman Poser of Brooklyn Law School for his comments and Elias Tzavelis
for his research assistance.
1. After my clerkship with Justice Blackmun, I worked for the Washington, D.C. and Paris,
France offices of Davis Polk & Wardwell as a corporate lawyer with specialties in financial
institutions regulation and securities offerings. I now teach courses on Corporations, Corporate
Finance, and Banking Law.
2. To my knowledge, there have been few general articles on this subject, as opposed to articles
on a given business or financial law case authored by Justice Blackmun. Some have written about
Justice Blackmun's contribution to related business areas, such as commercial speech. See, e.g.,
Karen Nelson Moore, Justice Blackmun's Contributions on the Court: The Commercial Speech and
State Taxation Examples, 8 H uiNE L. Rev. 29 (1985) (discussing how, in commercial speech cases,
Justice Blackmun wanted the consumer to be provided with as much information as possible
concerning professions and commercial interests that hindered competition and thus caused economic
harm to the consumer). A related relevant area is tax law, for Justice Blackmun was a tax lawyer.
Again to my knowledge, no one has written an article about Justice Blackmun's general contribution to
tax jurisprudence. Cf. Dan T. Coenen, Justice Blackmun, Federalism and Separation of Powers, 97
DICK. L. REV. 541, 548-49 (Spring 1993) (discussing Justice Blackmun's opinions on the effect of the
Commerce Clause on state taxation of interstate commerce).
3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4. See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson, Emancipation as Freedom in Roe v. Wade, 97 DICK. L. REV.
485 (Spring 1993). For other writings that focus on Justice Blackmun's judicial legacy in Roe v.
Wade, see Norman Dorsen, A Tribute to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, 97 DICK. L. REV. 607 (Spring
1993); William J. Brennan, Jr., Harry A. Blackmun, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 694 (1994); Estelle H. Rogers,
Thank You Justice Blackmun, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 734 (1994); Sarah Weddington, Parting Praise for
Justice Harry A. Blackmun, 43 Am. U. L. REv. 750 (1994) (providing a tribute from counsel for
petitioner in Roe).
5. See, e.g., Pamela Karlan, Bringing Compassion into the Province of Judging: Justice Black-
mun and the Outsiders, 97 DICK. L. REV. 527 (1993) (discussing, among other things, Justice
Blackmun's opinions on rights of prisoners, aliens, Native Americans, poor women, pregnant
teenagers, gays, and lesbians); Harold Hongju Koh, Equality with a Human Face: Justice Blackmun
and the Equal Protection of Aliens, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 51 (1985) (discussing Justice Blackmun's
opinions concerning aliens' rights); Herman Schwartz, Justice Blackmun, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 737
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My topic selection, however, presented some problems. It is proba-
bly accurate to say that, in recent times at least, Supreme Court Justices,
like many judges, are not particularly interested in reviewing and decid-
ing specialized issues of corporate, securities, or financial law. Supreme
Court Justices are, after all, human beings: like others who have arrived
at a preeminently political position, they care, in varying degrees, about
the publicity that naturally comes to them. They thus realize that, except
in the specialized financial press and financial circles, cases on corporate,
securities, and financial law rarely receive the national publicity and
attention that are accorded cases on the "great" constitutional issues
touching on socially significant matters. Accordingly, corporate, securi-
ties, and financial law cases are not greeted with much enthusiasm by the
Justices, who rank them in interest next to cases on tax, pension law and,
perhaps, water disputes between States.6 A good example of this prefer-
ence is the persistence of rumors that, when a Chief Justice wishes to
"punish" an Associate Justice, he assigns him or her cases from these
"humdrum" areas.7
The lack of enthusiasm for corporate, securities, and financial law
cases also reflects that, in recent times, the Justices have not been by
training or background familiar with the complexities of securities
markets (including international markets) and corporate finance that
increasingly characterize these areas of the law. Even if a Justice has had
some business law background, chances are that this experience is of a
regional nature; he or she generally has not spent years of practice on
Wall Street or in one of the other world financial centers, in a firm or
(1994) (discussing, among other things, Justice Blackmun's writings in Callins v. Collins and Bowers v.
Hardwick).
6. As in all general statements, there are some obvious exceptions to the above remarks. Justice
William 0. Douglas, known for his First Amendment decisions, was one of the authors of the
Securities Act of 1933 and a former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Prominent
judges who have shown great expertise in business law areas readily come to mind: Henry Friendly,
Richard Posner, Ralph Winter, and Frank Easterbrook (to say nothing of Justices of the Supreme Court
of Delaware).
7. The best example of this statement is Justice Blackmun. Chief Justice Burger, a boyhood
friend of Justice Blackmun's, was instrumental in the nomination of Justice Blackmun to the Court. It is
rumored that the Chief Justice, dissatisfied with Justice Blackmun's independence, "punished" him by
assigning him to write opinions in various technical areas, such as state taxation cases. See Stephen L.
Wasby, Justice Blackrmun in the Burger Court, 11 HAmLtNE L. REv. 183, 184, 196-197 (1988).
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organization devoted to a specialized corporate and financial practice. 8
In addition, if the Justices have been law teachers, they have usually
pursued traditional academic specialties that have little to do with corpo-
rate, securities, or financial law.9
In my experience, law clerks do a fair amount of work for the
Justices.10 However, usually we had even less experience on corporate,
8. In my year as a clerk on the Court, of all the Justices, Justice Powell appeared to have the most
experience in the corporate and securities law area. He had been a partner in a Richmond, Virginia
law firm, Hunton, Williams, Anderson, Gay and Moore, and had specialized in corporate law with
prominent corporate clients. See THE SuPREME COURT JusTicEs ILLusTRATEo BIOGRAPHIES, 1789-1993
at 492 (Clare Cushman ed., 1993). However, then, as now, Hunton, Williams was somewhat regional
in its practice and was not one of the firms one would immediately associate with a global financial
practice. Other Justices, such as Justices Rehnquist, Brennan, Marshall, White, and O'Connor, had
little financial law experience. New appointments have not necessarily changed the situation. See id.
at 517 (discussing Justice Kennedy's general law practice in Sacramento that focused upon corporate
work for small businesses); id. at 522 (discussing Justice Souter's practice of taxation and real estate in
a Concord, New Hampshire law firm); id. at 528 (discussing Justice Thomas's energy and
environmental practice).
Several Justices have experience and expertise in antitrust law, an important business law subject.
See id. at 502 (explaining that Justice Stevens practiced and taught antitrust law); id. at 512 (explaining
that Justice Scalia also practiced and taught antitrust law). However, this practice area tends to be
distinct from, although related to, corporate, securities, and financial institutions law practice. An
article has yet to be written concerning the effect that the unfamiliarity of Justices with specialized
business law subjects has had on the development of securities markets and financial institutions.
9. See David Von Drehle, Conventional Roles Hid a Revolutionary Intellect; Discrimination
Helped Spawn a Crusade, THE WASH. POST, July 18, 1993, at Al (observing that Justice Ginsburg
taught constitutional law and conflicts of law); Search of Westlaw, WLD-Judges, Anthony s Kennedy
(Nov. 10, 1994) (pointing out that Justice Kennedy taught constitutional law). Some Justices taught
antitrust law. See THE SUPREmE COURT J uslcEs, supra note 8, at 502 (observing that Justice Stevens
taught antitrust law); Search of Westlaw, WLD-Judges, Stephen /s Breyer, (Nov. 10, 1994) (observing
that Justice Breyer taught antitrust, administrative law, and economic regulation).
10. It has become fashionable, even among those who should know better, to disparage the work
of law clerks of Supreme Court Justices. Some are even surprised that a clerk might draft a Supreme
Court opinion. I am at a loss to explain why anyone, whether a Supreme Court Justice or other judge,
would be ashamed of admitting that a law clerk does much opinion and other writing. This is why the
clerk is hired in the first place! Given the workload of the Justices, it makes sense, in division of labor
terms, to have clerks do as much writing as possible. The Justice, at the top of the "pyramid," can edit
and rewrite as he or she sees fit. In my experience, this is no different from the situation in law firms,
where mid-level and senior partners supervise the work of large numbers of associates.
One could argue that this system no longer makes possible the "great" opinions of former times.
See, e.g., Charles W. Collier, The Use and Abuse of Humanistic Theory in Law: Reexamining the
Assumptions of Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship, 41 DUKE L.J. 191, 229 (1991) ("There are
increasingly indications that the function of the Court has changed over time, and that one is no longer
entitled to consider the work of a Justice as analogous to that of a poet or philosopher, i.e., as the
intellectual product of a unified mind."). One might well question whether this "golden" age of
judicial opinions ever existed and, in any event, we are well past the time when we can confidently
assert that an earlier historical time was somehow closer to the truth or the true way of behaving (or,
in this case, judging). Cf. JAcQuEs DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 49 (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak trans.,
1976).
Peirce goes very far in the direction that I have called the de-construction of the
transcendental signified, which, at one time or another, would place a reassuring end to
the reference from sign to sign. I have identified logocentrism and the metaphysics of
presence as the exigent, powerful, systematic, and irrepressible desire for such a
signified.
Id. Moreover, opinions have always been, to some degree, institutional products; the judicial
institutions are simply now more complex.
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securities, or financial law matters than did they. At best, we had some
summer work experience in corporate law firms or had paid attention to
our business law professors."l
In my experience, the Justices and their clerks take their responsibil-
ities seriously and only occasionally display some impatience with the
complex business and legal issues that can baffle even seasoned securi-
ties and financial market professionals. 12 This occasional impatience, or
even hostility, may -arise from what Professor Mark Roe has shown to be
a traditional American populist distrust of Wall Street and concentrated
financial power.13 Our country, locked as it is in a fierce global compe-
tition in product and capital markets that can threaten the well-being of
any nation, may little afford any such insensitivity to this business world,
especially from political appointees with lifetime tenure. 14
11. Of course, law school introductions to business law can be somewhat startling, at least from a
real world perspective. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited
Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE LJ. 1879 (1991) (arguing for the elimination of
limited liability for shareholders in mass tort situations); but see Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited
Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital Markets Perspective, 102 YALE LJ. 387 (1992) (pointing out
the real-world capital market problems with such a proposal).
12. In my term on the Court, I believe that this impatience was displayed in Pennzoil Co. v.
Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987), a case involving various challenges by Texaco to a Texas jury's
award of enormous damages ($10.53 billion) against it. Some members of the Court, particularly on
the "left," clearly felt that, but for the large sums involved in the controversy, the Court would never
have reviewed the case:
Because a wealthy business corporation has been ordered to pay damages in an amount
hitherto unprecedented, and finds its continued survival in doubt, we and the courts
below have been presented with arguments of great sophistication and complexity, all
concerned with a case which under clearly applicable principles should never have been
in the federal courts at all.
Id. at 26-27 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun had the good sense not to react cavalierly
and hostilely to a world-class company (which, incidentally, employed large numbers of people). In a
footnote to his own concurrence, he made the following observation: "Moreover, while there has
been some discussion about a 'special law' for multi-billion-dollar corporations, I would have thought
that our proper concern is with constitutional violations, not with our sympathy, or lack thereof, for a
particular litigant." Id. at 28 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
13. See Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 10,
52 (1991). "First, American public opinion has always mistrusted large institutions. That populist story
is well known as part of antitrust attacks on big business that endured beyond the populist politics of the
1890s. Less well known is that a similar sentiment militated in favor of fragmenting financial
institutions." Id.
14. E.g., Klaus Schwab & Claude Smadja, Power and Policy: The New Economic World Order,
HARV. Bus. REv. 40,41 (Nov.-Dec. 1994).
In fact, it has become a matter of life and death for corporations to take advantage of
such opportunities [delocalization of industrial production] in the face of what can truly
be termed megacompetition-yet another crucial aspect of the global economic
revolution. Corporations and countries must now compete not only against rivals in their
own league but also against a continual stream of newcomers, while at the same time
playing catch-up with competitors claiming to have made the latest break-throughs.
These competitive realities are creating intense pressure to rationalize production, cut
internal costs, and search for the least expensive production base.
Id. See also Frank J. Comes & Christopher Power, 21st Century Capitalism, Bus. WK., Nov. 18, 1994,
at 12, 13 (Special Bonus Issue).
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The topic of Justice Blackmun and corporate, securities, and finan-
cial law does have several advantages, however. Because it does not
focus on socially sensitive constitutional issues, it will likely not give rise
to impassioned public debate. Considering the global economic changes
now occurring that may significantly alter civil society, perhaps business
issues, rather than topics such as abortion and privacy rights, should be
the main subject of such debate. Accordingly, I need not address the
charge that has been leveled against Justice Blackmun as he neared
retirement: that he based his decisions on emotion, rather than on legal
reasoning.I5
In the following pages, I first briefly discuss Justice Blackmun's
background and familiarity with corporate, securities, and financial
institutions matters, legal or otherwise. Although not from a Wall Street
practice and on the bench for a significant period in the transformation
of American business and securities markets, Justice Blackmun exhibited
some familiarity with these issues. In this connection, I shall also refer to
Justice Blackmun's general attitude towards securities markets and large
financial institutions: a populist and somewhat pragmatic suspicion of
Will optimism about 21st century capitalism ultimately prove misguided? Hundreds of
millions of people will not benefit from this new economic order. Victims include an
older generation of unemployable Russians, the uprooted of India, and the newly idle of
Europe and the U.S. In its most unbridled form, capitalism certainly delivers wealth but
stumbles when it comes to distributing its rewards equitably enough. Resentment against
capitalism could provoke a backlash against free trade and its sponsors. And few
institutions now exist to regulate the excesses of global finance and post-cold-war
Jeopolitics.
Id.
15. See Jeffrey Rosen, Sentimental Journey: The Emotional Jurisprudence of Harry Blackmun,
THE NEw REPuBuc, May 2, 1994, at 13.
But feeling deeply is no substitute for arguing rigorously; and the qualities that made
Blackmun an admirable man ultimately condemned him to be an ineffective justice. By
reducing so many cases to their human dimensions and refusing to justify his impulses
with principled legal arguments, Blackmun showed the dangers of the jurisprudence of
sentiment. He committed liberals to the unfortunate and inaccurate proposition that
justices must resort to personal sympathy in order to justify liberal results.
Id. The charge has been made with respect to Justice Blackmun's dissent in Deshaney v. Winnebago
County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189,212 (1989) ("Poor Joshua! Victim of repeated attacks by
an irresponsible, bullying, cowardly, and intemperate father, and abandoned by respondents who
placed him in a dangerous predicament and who knew or learned what was going on, and yet did
essentially nothing .... "), and in his dissent from a denial of certiorari in Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct.
1127, 1128 (1994) (announcing opposition to the death penalty). There have been spirited defenses of
Justice Blackmun's "emotionalism," generally by former law clerks. See William Alden McDaniel,
Jr., Breathing Life into the Law, CoNN. L. Tam., Apr. 18, 1994, at 26.
One wonders if the people who pronounce these criticisms have ever read the justice's
opinions that they decry. If they had, they would have seen that big as his heart is,
Blackmun is and has been an outstanding lawyer whose expressions of constitutional and
moral values in his opinions have always been supported by sound legal analysis.
Id. I would have to agree with Mr. McDaniel's point of view: I never found Justice Blackmun
deciding a case purely on the basis of emotion.
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them and a concern about protecting the small investor in his or her
dealings with these sophisticated centers of financial power.
Next, I shall discuss how his dissent in a case on securities
arbitration, Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon ,16 particularly
exemplifies this suspicion and concern. In the final section, which
examines the impact of the dissent, I suggest that it had a long life. The
very problems with securities arbitration that he highlighted were the
ones with which the securities industry and market regulators grappled
from 1987 up to the present. He helped to encourage that industry, as
well as Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
"SEC"), to effect needed reforms in securities arbitration. Moreover, in
a development foreseen by Justice Blackmun, once such reforms were
effected, arbitration came to resemble the litigation system it had been
designed to replace.
II. THE BUSINESS LAW BACKGROUND OF JUSTICE BLACKMUN
It is a tribute to Justice Blackmun that, considering his background,
he has shown an admirable ability to deal with the difficult questions of
corporate, securities, and financial institutions law that he encountered on
the bench. His family background was a modest, but not poor, one, and
he grew up in St. Paul, Minnesota, far from Wall Street or other centers
of financial power.17 He had an extremely privileged education for the
period, receiving his B.A. and law degree from Harvard. However, his
life in this elite setting was not necessarily an easy one. He was a
scholarship student who also worked part-time to help fund his
schooling. No doubt, this education occasionally brought him into
contact with some members of the financial elite.18
Upon graduation, Justice Blackmun did not turn to Wall Street for
his career. Rather, he returned to Minnesota, where he served first as a
law clerk to Judge John B. Sanborn on the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, and then became associated with Dorsey & Whitney (then
Dorsey, Colman, Barker, Scott, and Barber), a prominent Minneapolis
firm. This experience in a firm with corporate clients no doubt brought
16. 482 U.S. 220 (1987) [hereinafter McMahon].
17. I picked up some biographical information from Justice Blackmun himself, although he is not
one to dwell upon his own past. For other biographical accounts, see THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES,
supra note 8, at 486-87; John A. Jenkins, A Candid Talk with Justice Blackmun, N.Y. TIMEs MAo., Feb.
20, 1983, at 20; Wasby, supra note 7, at 184-86; Gregg Orwoll, Harry Andrew Blackmun, 43 AM. U. L.
REv. 731 (1994).
18. Justice Blackmun is a precise man with an excellent memory. I thus fear inaccurately re-
peating his recollections. At the risk of being slightly mistaken, however, I recall that he stated that he
was acquainted at Harvard with a "Morgan" who was on the crew team (Justice Blackmun earned
money by driving a boat for the crew team).
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Justice Blackmun considerable familiarity with business and business law,
especially since his specialties were, among other things, tax and trust
and estates. Like the experience of many other Justices, Justice
Blackmun's corporate and other business law experience was regionally
based and not tied to the sophisticated financial markets in New York or
abroad.
As is well known, Justice Blackmun left Dorsey & Whitney to
become the first resident counsel to the Mayo Clinic, a position that was
ideal for him in light of his longtime interest in medicine. The
experience was unlikely, however, to have been as useful in improving
his expertise in sophisticated corporate, securities, and financial law as
would have been, say, a position of general counsel of an investment
bank or major commercial bank. Any general counsel would be
involved in some questions of finance, however. 19
Justice Blackmun was then appointed to the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit in 1959 and became an Associate Justice of the United
States Supreme Court in 1970. Thus, for thirty-four years until his
retirement in 1994 he was on the federal bench. This period was a time
of significant change in corporations, corporate finance, and financial
intermediaries, and saw a virtual transformation of Wall Street.20 As a
judge and later Justice, Justice Blackmun may have had more occasions
to consider these changes in the financial landscape than he did as a
practicing attorney. However, episodic reviews of a subject that are made
possible by judicial decision-making are not equivalent to day-to-day
experience in fields as complex as corporate, securities, and financial
institutions law.
From this background of considerable business and business law
sophistication and familiarity, even with a lack of professional activity in
the centers of corporate, securities, and financial institutions law, Justice
Blackmun developed a certain kind of jurisprudence in cases involving
the securities industry and large financial institutions, particularly when
they were in disputes with retail investors or consumers. 2 1 Justice
19. Once again, I seem to remember that Justice Blackmun met his Harvard Morgan acquaint-
ance at the Morgan Bank when on business there for the Mayo Clinic.
20. See, e4g., MARsHAL E. BLUME Er AL., REVOLUTION ON WALL STREET: THE RiSE AND DEcLINE OF
THE NEW YORK STocK ExCHANGE (1993).
21. The following generalizations must be qualified by the observation that Justices are not
generally free to make their own pronouncements on legal matters in opinions. See, e.g., Moore,
supra note 2, at 30 ("Certain factors largely beyond the control of a Justice will impact heavily on his
ability to develop the precise contours of a particular field."). They must await a case, although they
can influence which cases are selected for review. The case is further narrowed by the issues
accepted for review, and the Justices' views are further circumscribed by the parties' arguments.
Moreover, writing a majority, and sometimes a dissenting, opinion requires that the Justice make an
effort to please the other Justices (and their law clerks) who are interested in joining the opinion. This
process suggests why it is difficult for a Justice to produce a series of developed opinions on a given
1995]
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Blackmun's opinions, especially dissenting opinions, on complex
corporate transactions, securities markets, and financial institutions often
exhibit a concern to protect retail investors from the manipulatory
schemes of corporate, market, and financial professionals. 22 Justice
Blackmun appears to have a populist skepticism about, and suspicion of,
complex corporate transactions and financial dealings and markets, while
all the time understanding their complexity. This attitude is based on a
kind of pragmatic feeling that, because of the enormous amounts of
liquid assets (i.e., money and securities) at issue and because of the
special expertise involved in securities and other financial transactions,
market professionals are invariably tempted to profit from their position
at the expense of retail investors or consumers. 23 Justice Blackmun
would thus favor any legal efforts to improve the position of the investor
with respect to these professionals. This approach has long made Justice
Blackmun an ally of the SEC in its administration of the securities laws.
As I stated above, Justice Blackmun is in good company with his
populist suspicion of the securities and financial industry. But, as many
of our financial institutions have suffered in the last few years in their
global competition with foreign institutions, 24 perhaps this attitude
should give way to a concern about their competitive abilities. The
steady focus on retail investors and consumers might also be somewhat
subject. It appeared to be especially difficult for Justice Blackmun, who, because of his respect for
the legal process, was not inclined to manipulate it to put his views forward on a particular issue.
22. The best example of this attitude is in Justice Blackmun's opinions, generally dissenting,
dealing with the right of investors to bring a private right of action under Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder, and with the elements of
that cause of action. See WILLIAM L. CARY & MELViN ARON EIsENBERo, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPOAiONS 796-888 (6th ed. 1988) (referring to Justice Blackmun's dissents in, among others, Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976), Dirks v. Secs. and Exch. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), in a section devoted to a discussion of
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5). Justice Blackmun believed that investors needed this private right of
action to address the abuse by market professionals to which they were subject. This view, coupled
with a broad interpretation of the securities laws, characterized the Court that Justice Blackmun
entered in 1970. However, the Court's changing composition in ensuing years produced a new
majority whose members for varying reasons (e.g., hostility to plaintiffs' attorneys or to private rights
of action in general, or a desire to protect markets from "strike" suits) wanted to cut back on, or even
to eliminate, the Section 10(b) private right of action and to narrowly interpret the securities laws.
Accordingly, Justice Blackmun, whose views had not changed, found himself in dissent.
23. Other students of Justice Blackmun's jurisprudence have highlighted, in other contexts, his
pragmatism. See Coenen, supra note 2, at 555-57 (discussing Justice Blackmun's "meticulous regard
for factual nuance" and his emphasis on practical realities). His approach must be partly attributable
to his years as a practicing lawyer, who, unlike one who has spent an entire life in academia or on the
bench, would have the experience to realize that solutions, particularly in the business world, involve
pragmatic accommodations, and rarely absolute principles or extreme positions.
24. See, e.g., Statement by Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, Before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, Dec. 1,
1987,74 FED. RES. BuLL. 91 (1988), cited in JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFREY P. Ma.LER, BANKING LAw
AND REaULATION 557, 561 (1992) (describing problems created by the restrictions placed on United
States banking securities activity and the ability of the banks to compete effectively on a global scale).
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out of date at a time when large institutional investors increasingly
dominate financial markets. 25
On the other hand, perhaps it is too soon to dismiss this focus upon
retail investors. 26 That these investors have simply moved up the
"chain" of investment holdings, i.e., they are now mutual fund
shareholders and beneficiaries of pension funds, rather than direct
shareholders in companies, does not get rid of, but only displaces,
concerns about market abuses. 27 Furthermore, technological advances
may change the way retail investors deal with foreign or domestic
financial institutions, markets, and companies. 28 Thus, the concern
Justice Blackmun exhibited for the retail investor may become
increasingly relevant in the market conditions of the future.29
III. THE McMAHON CASE
The Court had agreed to hear Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon,30 to which Justice Blackmun would dissent, in its 1986 term.31
The McMahons had several brokerage accounts with the then
25. The literature on institutional investors and their increasing dominance of the world financial
markets is plentiful. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Peter Cramton, Relational Investing and Agency Theory,
15 CARDOzo L. REv. 1033, 1035 (1994).
26. Judges, like Justice Blackmun, cannot ignore these investors when the federal securities acts
have investor protection as a primary goal.
27. In fact, recent SEC efforts are directed at dealing with abuse at this indirect holding level.
See, e.g., SEC to Propose Rules on Fund Disclosure of Derivatives, Insider Trading Policies, BNA
Banking Daily (Sept. 28, 1994) available in LEXIS, Banking Library, BNABD file (discussing SEC
Chairman Levitt's concern with personal investing by fund managers).
28. See Ross A. Kaplan, Annual Meetings: Put Them On-Line, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 16, 1994, Sec. 3.
at 1 (discussing methods by which annual meetings could be held "online"); Michael R. Sesit, Direct
Access to World Markets Is Said to Be Easier and Cheaper, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 1994, at CI
(discussing a new computerized system for trading securities around the world designed for
institutional traders, but capable of expansion to individual investors).
29. The present focus of the current SEC chairman, Arthur Levitt, is clearly upon protection of
the individual investor. See Levitt Reiterates Views on Plan to Merge SEC, CFTC, BNA Banking Daily
(Dec. 7, 1994) available in LEXIS, Banking Library, BNABD file ("The SEC chairman spoke on a
wide range of subjects within his agency's jurisdiction, and drew on the broad theme of protection of
the individual investor as the agency's guiding mission.") Whether this will be an enduring concern, or
only the product of a Democratic administration, remains to be seen.
30. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
31. I was the clerk in Justice Blackmun's chambers assigned to work on the case with him. In my
time, this meant that, after reading all of the briefs, relevant cases, and law review articles, I wrote a
memorandum on the case, with my recommendations, to prepare Justice Blackmun for oral argument.
After the oral argument, when Justice Brennan (the senior Justice in dissent) asked Justice Blackmun
to write the dissent, I drafted the dissent under his direction. Again in my time, for a clerk to draft an
opinion did not mean producing a rough draft and conducting constant discussions with the Justice to
fill it out and perfect it. Justice Blackmun had an enormous amount of work to do: he was preparing
for and hearing other oral arguments; he was editing or writing other opinions; and he was reviewing
petitions for certiorari and emergency demands for relief from the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit over which he presided. Justice Blackmun thus wanted nothing less than as finished an opinion
as a clerk could produce.
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Shearson/American Express, Inc. ("Shearson"). 32 As was standard in
certain kinds of customer agreements in the securities industry, the
Shearson agreements with the McMahons provided that any dispute
would be settled by arbitration under the rules of one of the industry's
Self-Regulatory Organizations ("SROs"). 33 A dispute arose when the
McMahons claimed that their broker engaged in excessive trading on
their accounts and had otherwise engaged in fraudulent behavior. 34 The
McMahons brought suit in federal court in New York, alleging, among
other things, that their broker had violated Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") and Rule lOb-5
promulgated thereunder. 35 The District Court granted Shearson's
motion to compel arbitration on the Section 10(b) claims, but the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed this disposition. 36
It was true during Justice Blackmun's time on the Court that, if one
wanted a full, impartial understanding of the development of a legal
issue and the background of a particular case, it was best to read one of
his opinions. 37 He simply insisted upon thoroughness in writing to
which his name was attached. This fact alone shows why statements that
his jurisprudence is primarily sentimental or emotional are themselves
ridiculous.
In Part I of his dissent in McMahon, Justice Blackmun set forth the
history of the arbitrability of Section 10(b) claims. 38 He observed that in
Wilko v. Swan,39 the Court had declined to enforce a predispute
agreement to compel arbitration of claims under the Securities Act. 40
For thirty-two years following Wilko, all lower courts that had considered
the arbitrability of claims under the Exchange Act had taken the same
approach, using Wilko's reasoning.41 Although faced directly with the
32. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,222-23 (1987).
33. Id. at 223.
34. Id.
35. Id. The McMahons also alleged a RICO claim, and the arbitrability of such a claim was also
an issue for the Court. Id. at 224. However, I shall not discuss this issue here.
36. Id. at 223-24.
37. This characteristic of Justice Blackmun's writing contrasted with that of certain other Justices
who were known for keeping opinions to a minimum size or for cutting entire sections from opinions.
While the merits of this other form of writing or editing can be debated, it produced opinions that were
often disjointed and unpersuasive, and that gave the impression of a judicial fiat. Justice Blackmun's
approach, by which he would attempt to address all of the parties' arguments, the reasoning of lower
courts, and the contentions of opposing opinions, did much, I think, for enhancing the Court's authority,
which, after all, owes much to the persuasive force, or rhetoric, of its opinions.
38. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 243-49 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
39. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
40. McMahon, 482 US. at 245 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427
(1953)).
41. See, e.g., Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
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issue in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,42 the Court did not reach it
because the dispute involved sophisticated commercial parties and
international business concerns. However, the Court mentioned in dicta
an argument that Wilko should not literally be applied to Exchange Act
claims.43 The lower courts did not take up this argument, and the
legislative history of 1975 amendments to the Exchange Act suggested
that Congress approved of both Wilko and its extension to Exchange Act
claims. 44 In Justice White's concurrence to Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
Byrd,45 this argument resurfaced without any discussion or refinement.46
The repetition of the argument triggered, for the first time, some conflict
in the lower courts47 -always the major criterion for a grant of certiorari.
Justice Blackmun's discussion of the background to the issue of the
arbitrability of Section 10(b) claims says something about his
jurisprudence. He does not believe that, surreptitiously or by indirection,
Justices should keep an issue alive so that they, or their successors, might
have another chance to address it and to have their views prevail, perhaps
when the Court's composition has changed. 48 This silent activism is not
the Court's role, particularly with respect to a settled issue. In Justice
42. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
43. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506,513-14 (1974) (characterizing the argument as a
"colorable argument"), discussed in McMahon, 482 U.S. at 244 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(providing the best description of the "colorable argument").
The "colorable argument" amounted to a listing by the Scherk Court of the differences
between a [Section] 12(2) action, as it had been described by the Wilko Court, and a
[Section] 10(b) action under the Exchange Act. First, the Court noted that, while
[Section] 12(2) of the Securities Act provided an express cause of action, (Section]
10(b) did not contain on its face such a cause of action, which, instead, had been implied
from its language and that of Rule lOb-5. Second, the Court explained that the Exchange
Act did not set forth the "special right" that the Wilko Court found established in
[Section] 12(2). Finally, the Court observed that the jurisdictional provisions of the two
Acts were not the same. Under [Section] 22(a) of the Securities Act, suit could be
brought in federal or state court, whereas, under [Section] 27 of the Exchange Act, suit
could be brought only in federal court. In sum, the overall thrust of the "colorable
argument," as stated by the Court in Scherk, seemed to be as follows: The Wilko Court
declined to enforce arbitration of [Section] 12(2) claims because it found significant the
special nature of that cause of action, but a similar concern does not apply to [Section]
10(b) claims, which are neither "special" nor "express".
482 U.S. at 244 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
44. Id. at 246-48.
45. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
46. See 482 U.S. at 248 & n.7 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (analyzing the resurgence of the
argument in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985)).
47. Id. at 248-49.
48. When Justice Blackmun wanted to keep an issue alive, especially an unpopular one, he was
at least open about it. See, e.g., Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. at 1138.
1 am more optimistic, though, that this Court eventually will conclude that the effort to
eliminate arbitrariness while preserving fairness 'in the infliction of [death] is so plainly
doomed to failure that it-and the death penalty-must be abandoned altogether.' . . . I
may not live to see that day, but I have faith that eventually it will arrive.
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Blackmun's view, the "colorable argument" was just a way for Justices,
like Justice White, who were hostile to the private right of action under
Section 10(b), to keep alive an issue that would enable them, someday, to
cut back this private right.
In their briefs, petitioner Shearson advanced a form of the
"colorable argument," contending that, among other things, an implied
right of action under Section 10(b) did not deserve the same protection
that the Wilko Court had extended to an express right of action under
Section 12(2).49 They also argued that the Wilko Court's view of
securities arbitration was dated, given the improvements in arbitration,
and thus they suggested that the Court should overrule Wilko.
In an amicus brief, the SEC agreed with the position of overruling
Wilko based upon improvements in arbitration and its oversight of the
SROs.50 This position was surprising because, before this brief, as Justice
Blackmun observed, the SEC
consistently took the position that [Section] 10(b) claims, like
those under [Section] 12(2), should not be sent to arbitration,
that predispute arbitration agreements, where the investor was
not advised of his right to a judicial forum, were misleading,
and that the very regulatory oversight upon which the
Commission now relies could not alone make securities-
industry arbitration adequate.51
The McMahons contended that Wilko should be extended to
Exchange Act claims and questioned whether arbitration had in fact
improved. 52
McMahon was not an easy case for Justice Blackmun. He was not
against arbitration per se, for he had recently authored an oft-cited
opinion favoring the arbitration of antitrust claims. 53 However, as
suggested above, he was an ardent defender of the private right of action
49. See Brief for Petitioners at 14-33, Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220 (1987) (arguing for a distinction between Section 10(b) and Section 12(2) rights of action).
50. See Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission at 8-21, Shearson/Ameican Express,
Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (amicus curiae). The SEC filed something of a schizophrenic
brief. On the one hand, it opposed any effort to undercut the authority of private rights of action under
Section 10(b) and thus did not support the "colorable argument." See id. at 21-26. On the other hand,
the SEC thought that its oversight of the SROs' arbitration procedures justified the arbitration of Section
10(b) claims. Id.
51. 482 U.S. at 262 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
52. See Brief for Respondents at 21-34, Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220 (1987).
53. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626-27 (1985)
("[Wie are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the




under Section 10(b) and a believer in the policy of the federal securities
laws to protect individual investors against the abuses of the securities
industry. He was thus not inclined to undermine Wilko or to fail to
extend the case to Exchange Act claims on the basis of their "implied"
status.
My recommendation to Justice Blackmun was that, given his general
position on Section 10(b) claims and the SEC's suspicious change in
position, he should vote to extend Wilko to Exchange Act claims. It was,
however, unclear to me how he would vote. His custom generally was to
read the bench memorandum and the parties' briefs, to do whatever
supplemental research interested him, perhaps to ask us a question or two
about a particular point and then to go into oral argument without
always revealing how he might be leaning.
My recollection of the oral argument was that it did not really
disclose where the votes would fall. Justice White, who clearly was in
favor of the arbitration of Section 10(b) claims, said nothing, as was
typical of him. Neither did Justice Blackmun, as was also characteristic
of him. The then new Justice Scalia closely questioned both sides, as did
Justice O'Connor. Both of them were particularly interested in the
adequacy of arbitration procedures for investors' claims.
At the conference held at the end of the week, where the Justices
voted on the cases that had been argued, McMahon was decided by a 5-4
vote in favor of enforcing the pre-dispute arbitration clause and thus of
sending the Section 10(b) claims to arbitration. In my time, law clerks
were never present when the Justices voted on cases. However, some
Justices, including Justice Blackmun, would explain to their clerks the
views and votes of the other Justices, as articulated at the conference.
From a collective pooling of information, we clerks could often
determine what had occurred in conference and be in a better position to
draft opinions.
Some Justices simply thought, without more articulation of their
reasoning, that Wilko had been wrongly decided in the first place and
thus they were reluctant to extend it. Others in the majority, particularly
Justice Powell and Justice O'Connor, found persuasive the SEC's
contention that arbitration was much improved. On the losing side, both
Justices Blackmun and Stevens were disturbed by the fact that a decision
to send Section 10(b) claims to arbitration might in effect overrule
Wilko, which had been the law for over thirty years and which Congress
had appeared to approve in its 1975 amendments to the Exchange Act.
Moreover, both Justices were suspicious of the SEC's eleventh hour
change in position.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist assigned the majority opinion to Justice
O'Connor. In her opinion, she emphasized the strong federal policies in
favor of arbitration and read Wilko as basically resting upon a concern
with the 1953 inadequacies of securities arbitration. 54 She then observed
that, as the Court examined arbitration in the years following Wilko, it
found that many of the Wilko concerns had vanished: "Thus, the
mistrust of arbitration that formed the basis for the Wilko opinion in
1953 is difficult to square with the assessment of arbitration that has
prevailed since that time." 55 She found further support for her position
in the SEC oversight of arbitration and Congress' failure expressly to
extend Wilko to 1934 Act claims.
As Professors Loss and Seligman observe in their treatise, Justice
Blackmun's dissent, in which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined, "had
a bite." 56  The opening sentences of the dissent suggest Justice
Blackmun's main focus and owe something to his populist skepticism of
the securities industry. First, he observed that federal securities acts were
designed "to protect investors from predatory behavior of securities
industry personnel." 57 Second, he pointed out that the Court was
"leav[ing] [the] claims [under the Exchange Act] to the arbitral forum
of the securities industry at a time when the industry's abuses towards
investors are more apparent than ever." 58
Thus, in Part II(A) of his dissent in McMahon, he could disagree
with the majority's assertion that Wilko was only about the former
inadequacies of arbitration. Rather, the Wilko Court recognized that the
"policy of investor protection in the Securities Act" revealed Congress'
decision to exempt Securities Act claims from the reach of the
Arbitration Act.59 Similar reasoning applied to claims under the
Exchange Act, which had the same investor protection policy. In Justice
Blackmun's view, an investor's right to a judicial forum for his Securities
Act claims helped to put him "on an equal footing with those in the
securities industry." 60 If Congress had determined that many investors
54. 482 U.S. at 228-29.
55. Id. at 233.
56. See Louis Loss & JOEL SEUGMAN, SEcURTIEs REGULATION 4568 (3d ed. 1993).
As was his wont, Justice Stevens wrote separately to state that given the uniformity of views
among the lower courts before Justice White had revived the "colorable argument," the "longstanding
interpretation [that Wilko applied to 1934 Act claims] creates a strong presumption, in my view, that
any mistake that the courts may have made in interpreting the statute is best remedied by the
Legislative, not the Judicial, Branch." 482 U.S. at 268-69 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Although not joining Justice Blackmun's dissent, he referred favorably to Justice
Blackmun's views expressed there. Id. at 269.
57. 482 U.S. at 243 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 252-53.
60. Id. at 251.
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were in a situation of unequal bargaining power with the securities
industry, their right to a judicial forum would correct the imbalance.
That the securities industry had long campaigned for arbitration showed
that the judicial forum was not in its interest.
If arbitration had so greatly improved since Wilko's time and if it
thus offered the "functional equivalent" of a judicial forum for
investors with Section 10(b) claims, a strong argument existed for not
extending Wilko's reasoning to such claims. Justice Blackmun
recognized the force of this argument, which the SEC advanced.
However, he felt that this argument, which amounted to an overruling of
Wilko, should be explored not by the Court, but by Congress, which had
the resources to examine improvements in arbitration. Moreover, Justice
Blackmun thought that the features of arbitration that the Wilko Court
found problematic -absence of a record, no arbitrator opinions,
limitation on judicial review-were still present in 1987.61 He also
recognized that, despite the increasing codification of arbitration
procedures, the public still felt that the forum was "slanted" in favor of
the securities industry.
The SEC's amicus brief, upon which the majority placed great
reliance, 62 particularly surprised Justice Blackmun. Justice Blackmun
traced the history of the SEC's position on arbitration of securities
disputes, observing that it had long opposed pre-dispute agreements to
arbitrate. 63  He also observed that the SEC's vaunted oversight of
arbitration amounted only to reviewing SRO rule proposals dealing with
arbitration, not to monitoring actual arbitration results and procedures.64
He thus chastised the SEC for inexplicably giving in to the securities
industry on an investor protection issue.
My experience as a law clerk suggested to me that politics is
generally present, either directly or indirectly, in most Court cases. Here
the activist conservative majority, consisting of the Chief Justice and
Justices White, Powell, O'Connor, and Scalia, was reaching out to limit
rights of investors under Section 10(b) by sending these claims to a then
questionable arbitration forum. The SEC, feeling the deregulatory
pressure that characterized Washington in those years, was shifting its
position on arbitration. Confidence in deregulation and liberalized
markets was still strong, and the market for corporate control was in full
61. Id. at 259-60.
62. 482 U.S. at 238.
63. Id. at 262-64 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 265.
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swing. 65 However, as Justice Blackmun pointed out, abuses were
beginning to surface in the securities markets at this end of the "go-go"
1980s, abuses that raised the question whether the SEC and SROs were
adequately policing the markets.66
Given the majority's activism, Justice Blackmun made a few activist
statements of his own. He gave a prominent position to information
cited by respondents: that the House Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations was conducting an investigation into the adequacy of
arbitration procedures at a time of increasing securities law violations
and that the Chairman of the Subcommittee was surprised by the SEC's
new position on arbitration. 67 This statement might encourage Congress
to take up a matter that belonged in its domain. Justice Blackmun also
urged lower courts to take seriously their limited power to review
arbitration decisions. Finally, in what we shall see was a perceptive
remark, Justice Blackmun observed that the decision might in fact
increase court litigation, as investor-plaintiffs, upset by being forced into
arbitration, would find new reasons to bring arbitration decisions to the
courts for review: "It is thus ironic that the Court's decision, no doubt
animated by its desire to rid the federal courts of these suits, actually
may increase litigation about arbitration." 68
IV. THE EFFECTS OF THE McMAHON DISSENT
It may be somewhat odd to spend much time on a Justice's dissent
in which, as in the McMahon case, he takes a position that will likely
never prevail. Several years after the Court announced the McMahon
decision, it went the further, expected step of explicitly reversing Wilko
in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.69 A
65. Change, and the 1987 market crash, were just around the comer. For example, in the same
term, the Court, per Justice Powell, issued its opinion in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S.
69 (1987). There, the Court upheld an Indiana anti-takeover statute against federal pre-emption and
Commerce Clause challenges, a decision that gave management an additional weapon in resisting
takeovers. Id. at 94. Justice Blackmun, with Justices White and Stevens, were in dissent. Id. at 97.
How could Justice Blackmun reconcile his vote in this case with the dissent in McMahon? Justice
Blackmun was not opposed to a free market; he simply wanted a market that was not skewed in favor
of certain participants. The state anti-takeover acts, such as Indiana's, could hurt small investors by
preventing them from tendering their shares in profitable change-of-control transactions.
66. 482 U.S. at 265-66 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 266-67.
68. Id. at 268.
69. 490 U.S. 477,484 (1989). It is interesting that Justice Blackmun did not even bother to write
separately in this case, only joining Justice Stevens' brief dissent. In fact, there was little more to say,
given his earlier dissent, which Justice Stevens cited approvingly. See id. at 487 n.3 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). What little there was to say was well stated by Justice Stevens:
In the final analysis, a Justice's vote in a case like this depends more on his or her views
about the respective law-making responsibilities of Congress and this Court than on
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similarly constituted majority (with Justice Kennedy replacing Justice
Powell) now considered that claims under the Securities Act of 1933
could be referred to arbitration. 70 Moreover, Justice Blackmun's dissent
in McMahon is unlikely to have the social resonance of others dealing
with highly charged, emotional subjects. 71
However, it was interesting for me to consider what had become of
securities arbitration after McMahon. Although my securities law
practice had little to do with arbitration, I had heard about Rodriguez and
noted occasional references to securities arbitration in the financial press.
The question arose whether, from the perspective of individual investors,
securities arbitration had improved. Any improvements, I thought, could
perhaps owe something to Justice Blackmun's dissent. Because the
McMahon majority appeared to assume that arbitration, as it then stood
in 1986, was adequate, the substance of that majority opinion could
hardly have been a catalyst for arbitral change. 72
To my surprise, I found that arbitration had changed significantly
following McMahon and that these changes answered many of Justice
Blackmun's criticisms. Although causation in the law, and history, is
complex, the least that could be said was that his McMahon dissent had
contributed in some way to this transformation of arbitration. Because I
am not an expert on securities arbitration and because many excellent
articles have been published on that subject both before and since
McMahon,73 what follows is not a comprehensive analysis or survey.
Rather, I (i) highlight the history of arbitration reform following
McMahon and (ii) refer to a few changes in arbitration that addressed
Justice Blackmun's criticism.
conflicting policy interests. Judges who have confidence in their own ability to fashion
public policy are less hesitant to change the law than those of us who are inclined to give
wide latitude to the views of the voters' representatives on non-constitutional matters.
Id. at 487.
70. Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
71. One thinks, for example, of his oft-cited dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
72. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 233 ("Even if Wilko's assumptions regarding arbitration were
valid at the time Wilko was decided, most certainly they do not hold true today for arbitration
procedures subject to the SEC's oversight authority*"). I would thus qualify the remark of my
colleague, Professor Norman Poser, who in a brief but very useful comment on securities arbitration,
observed that "[liargely in response to McMahon, arbitration has changed dramatically, adapting to its
new role as the normal method of resolving disputes between the securities industry and its
customers." Norman S. Poser, When ADR Eclipses Litigation: The Brave New World of Securities
Arbitration, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1095, 1097 (1993). The McMahon majority left investors with no
choice but arbitration. The process improved, but only because the securities industry felt the need to
improve its arbitration procedures and the SEC and Congress kept the pressure on it to do so. I suggest
that Justice Blackmun's dissent was also a factor in this improvement.
73. See Loss & SEajOMix, supra note 56, at 4552 n.218 (providing a useful bibliography on
securities arbitration).
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A. LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY REACTION
The McMahon decision came down on June 8, 1987. As noted
above, already the then powerful Representative Dingell was suggesting
that Congressional action might be needed to protect investors from an
inadequate forum in which to litigate securities law claims. Then
followed the significant October 1987 stock market crash, which not
only undermined the confidence of investors in the markets but also
increased the number of arbitrations. 74 In the first half of 1988, the
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance of the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce held a series of hearings on
arbitration reform. 75 Participants in the hearings frequently cited Justice
Blackmun's dissent as a particularly good statement of the problems of
arbitration. 76 One of the purposes of the hearings was to provide
legislative history for a bill designed to reform arbitration. 77
As it happened, the arbitration bill died in Committee. 78 However,
the threat of Congressional action placed pressure upon the securities
industry and the SEC. In both 1987 and 1988, the SEC sent letters to
74. See Arbitration Reform: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and
Finance of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 265, 266 (1988)
[hereinafter Arbitration Reform Hearings] (statement of James C. Meyer, Pres. N. Am. Sec. Adm'rs
Ass'n) ("Use of securities arbitration increased dramatically in 1987 as a result of two key events: the
U.S. Supreme Court's June 8, 1987 decision in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon
("Shearson"), which upheld the enforceability of mandatory predispute arbitration agreements, and
the stock market crash of October."), cited in Perry E. Wallace, Jr., Securities Arbitration After
McMahon, Rodriguez, and the New Rules: Can Investors' Rights Really Be Protected?, 43 VAND. L.
REV. 1199, 1200 n.6 (1990). Professor Wallace's article summarizes well the history of legislative and
regulatory efforts to respond to McMahon.
75. See Arbitration Reform Hearings, supra note 74. In those hearings, which were held on
March 31, June 9 and July 12, 1988, Congress obtained the testimony of numerous experts and
interested parties in the field of securities arbitration. Id. Experts included counsel who argued
McMahon before the Court, Theodore A. Krebsbach of Shearson and Theodore G. Eppenstein who
represented the McMahons, as well as Professor Poser. Id.
76. Not surprisingly, it was particularly cited by those, such as Mr. Eppenstein, who were in
favor of legislation reforming securities arbitration. See, e.g., Arbitration Reform Hearings, supra note
74, at 63 (statement of Mr. Eppenstein) ("It is our belief, as confirmed by the dissenting opinion of
Justice Harry A. Blackmun in McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2359, that it is now up to Congress to restore
rationality to this once settled area of law."); id. at 19 ("The chairman mentioned something that
Justice Blackmun stated in his dissenting opinion and that was that there must be something to the fact
that the Plaintiffs bar for the big securities fraud case wants to go to court and the securities industry
wants to... send it to arbitration."). But see id. at 313, 331 (statement of Edward O'Brien, President,
Securities Industry Association) (disputing several of Justice Blackmun's conclusions).
77. See Arbitration Reform Hearings, supra note 74, at 463 (statement of Representative
Boucher, June 30, 1988) (introducing on behalf of himself and Representatives Markey and Dingell,
the text of H.R. 4960 which, among other things, prohibited brokers from refusing to deal with
customers who declined to sign a pre-dispute arbitration agreement, required the arbitration clause to
be prominently displayed and its consequences discussed, and provided for fair arbitration
procedures).
78. See Wallace, supra note 74, at 1225 n.144 (providing a summary of the legislative history of
the Arbitration Reform Hearings).
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the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration, which was responsible
for developing and refining the Uniform Code of Arbitration, 79 and to
the SROs, requesting them to address arbitration issues. 80 Various
meetings between these organizations occurred with the result that the
Uniform Code of Arbitration was further amended and the SROs
proposed rule changes to their own arbitration codes to make them
compatible with the Uniform Code's amendments. The SEC approved
these changes in 1989. Still not convinced that arbitration was
adequately serving small investors, Representatives Dingell and Markey
requested the GAO to examine SRO arbitration.81 In 1992, the GAO
delivered its report, some of the results of which I shall briefly discuss
below .82
B. A FEW CHANGES IN ARBITRATION
In his McMahon dissent, Justice Blackmun was concerned that
numerous federal securities law claims would end up in arbitration
because of the majority's decision to permit enforcement of pre-dispute
agreements to arbitrate. He feared that, because of certain features of
securities arbitration identified by the Wilko Court, it would be difficult
for courts or the SEC to monitor arbitration proceedings and arbitrator
misbehavior. An essential condition of judicial review is a record of
proceedings. As Justice Blackmun emphasized in his dissenting opinion,
however, most 1987 securities arbitrations, just like those in 1953, did
not require production of a record unless the arbitrators or parties
requested it.83
79. The history of the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration and the Uniform Code of
Arbitration it produced are described by one of the conference's original members. See Constantine
N. Katsoris, Punitive Damages in Securities Arbitration: The Tower of Babel Revisited, 18 FORDHAM
URB. LJ. 573, 579-81 (1991).
80. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 26,805, [1989] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,414
(May 10, 1989), at 80,100 (describing the history of the SEC and SRO correspondence) [hereinafter
Release].
81. See Wallace, supra note 74, at 1225 n.144.
82. See UNrrw STATES GENERAL AccoUNTNG OFCE, SE CuRms ARBIT.ATION: How INVE RS
FARE (May 1992) (GAO/GGD-94-74), reprinted in 1 SECuRITIEs ARBITRATION 1992, at 21-133 (PLI
Corp. Law Practice Course Handbook Series No. 781, 1992) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
83. See McMahon. 482 U.S. at 259 (footnote omitted) ("As at the time of Wilko, preparation of a
record of arbitration proceedings is not invariably required today.").
1995] 163
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 71:145
Related to his concern about the general absence of a record was his
observation that arbitrators were not required to justify, and were even
discouraged from justifying, their decisions.84 Justice Blackmun
understood that this criticism went to the heart of arbitration, which was
designed to be a speedy process that did not necessarily have lawyer-
judges using legal reasoning. Opinion writing could delay the
arbitration process and even hamper the historical prerogative of
arbitrators to decide a case on the basis of their sense of justice.8 5
With respect to a record and opinions, the situation is now different
from that of Wilko and McMahon. Following McMahon, the SEC urged
the SROs to require that a record be made with respect to each
arbitration.86 The Uniform Code was accordingly amended, as were the
corresponding SRO rules, to make possible this essential feature for
judicial review.8 7 Because opinions characterize the judicial process,
arbitration rules do not yet mandate them. At the SEC's urging,88 the
Uniform Code and SRO rules were modified to require arbitrators to
provide limited information on arbitration awards, and this information
had to be made public. 8 9 Although declining in 1989 to enforce an
84. See 482 U.S. at 259 (citations omitted) ("Moreover, arbitrators are not bound by precedent
and are actually discouraged by their associations from giving reasons for a decision.").
85. Id.. Some arbitration experts argue that the practice of writing opinions in arbitration is gen-
erally not useful except in cases involving complex issues, large amounts of money, and even class
actions, precisely because it hinders arbitrators from making what they feel to be a "just" award. See,
e.g., Wallace, supra note 74, at 1248.
86. See Release, supra note 80, at 1 80,108 (explaining that "[i]n its September 10. 1987 letter,
the Commission requested that SRO arbitration departments amend their rules to assure that records of
arbitration proceedings are made and preserved. These records are necessary for courts to use in
conjunction with any review of the proceedings they may make.").
87. See, e.g., CODE OF ARBrmATIoN SEc. 37 (1993), reprinted in 1 SacuRrmEs ARBrrRAON 1994,
218 (PLI Corp. Law Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-851, 1994) ("A verbatim record by
stenographic reporter or tape recording of all arbitration hearings shall be kept."); New York Stock
Exchange Arbitration Rule 623, reprinted in 1 Sacuitms A RBIRATION 1994, at 256 (PLI Corp. Law
Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-851, 1994) ("A verbatim record of all arbitration hearings
shall be kept by stenographic reporter or tape recording."). Professor Wallace sees this rule change
as a direct reaction to Justice Blackmun's criticisms of arbitration. See Wallace, supra note 74, at
1247.
88. See Release, supra note 80, at $ 80,109. The proposed H.R. 4960 would also have required
the SROs to have a rule requiring arbitrators to give "a brief written statement of (i) the reasons for
the decision, and (ii) the elements of the award .... Arbitration Reform Hearings, supra note 74, at
466.
89. See Uniform Code Section 41(0, reprinted in 1 SECuRITrrIS ARBITRATION 1994, supra note 87,
at 220; New York Stock Exchange Arbitration Rule 627(e), reprinted in I SECURITIES ARBITRATION
1994, supra note 87, at 257-58. For example, Rule 627(e) provides that:
The award shall contain the names of the parties, the name(s) of counsel, if any, a
summary of the issues, including the type(s) of any security or product, in controversy,
the damages and/or other relief requested, the damages and/or other relief awarded, a
statement of any other issues resolved, the names of arbitrators, the date the claim was
filed and the award rendered, the number and dates of hearing sessions, the location of
the hearing, and the signatures of the arbitrators concurring in the award.
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opinion requirement on the SROs, the SEC thought that securities
arbitrators themselves might develop a practice of writing opinions. 90
According to Professor Poser, this practice is gradually coming into
existence. 91
In McMahon, Justice Blackmun was concerned about investors'
rights not only because arbitration's structural defects made judicial
review difficult, but also because, as the Wilko Court had observed, the
grounds for this review were limited. 92 At the end of his dissent, he
urged lower courts to use their review power,93 but I do not think that he
was particularly sanguine that such review offered much hope to
investors unhappy with arbitration. However, there is some evidence that
as arbitration has become the dominant forum for disputes between
New York Stock Exchange Arbitration Rule 627(e), reprinted in I SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1994,
supra note 87, at 257-58.
90. See Release, supra note 80, at 1 80,109. "In the labor area, arbitrators have voluntarily
developed a practice of writing opinions in order to help themselves understand developments in the
labor arena. The opinions were not mandated and were not developed to enable courts to review
arbitral decisions." Id. (footnotes omitted). The SEC observed that the changes to arbitration rules
approved by its order were already significant and that the verbatim record was adequate for the
purposes of court review. See id. at n.45.
91. See Poser, supra note 72, at 1107.
Although arbitrators still do not usually state the reasons for their decisions, there is an
increasing tendency to write opinions. Unlike judicial opinions, arbitrators' opinions do
not have precedential effect, but some of them are summarized in the financial press,
and they are likely to influence arbitrators in subsequent cases. Furthermore, a monthly
subscription service is available that summarizes awards and makes opinions available to
subscribers.
Id.
92. Under Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act, an award may be vacated for the following
reasons:
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing,
upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
9 U.S.C. § 10 (a)(1992). A court may also vacate an arbitration award if the arbitrators "manifest[ly]
disregard" the law. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427,436 (1953).
93. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,267 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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brokers and individual investors, courts have expanded their grounds for
review .94 Moreover, it is particularly ironic that some members of the
securities industry, who were so content with arbitration in McMahon and
Rodriguez, now urge enhanced judicial review when the results of
arbitration do not turn out to their liking.95
Even more than judicial review, what concerned Justice Blackmun
was that securities arbitration in the SROs constituted an industry forum
and that investors believed it to be unfair to them. Given his belief that
securities laws were designed to equalize the bargaining position of the
individual investor in his or her dealings with the securities industry, it
seemed inappropriate to him to send investor-broker disputes to a forum
operated by that industry. 96 At the time of McMahon, there was some
evidence that despite improvements, securities arbitration was partial to
the securities industry. 97 Justice Blackmun also recognized that even if
this forum was neutral, individual investors thought that it was biased.
Justice Blackmun's concern with something so "soft" as perception or
confidence does not mark him as a less than rigorous thinker in the
financial law area. The "intangibles," such as investors' feelings about
and confidence in markets and market participants, could be the greatest
source of concern to market regulators like the SEC.98
94. See, e.g., C. Evan Stewart, Securities Arbitration Appeal: Oxymoron No Longer?, 79 Ky. L.J.
347, 353-54 (1990-91).
First, more courts now embrace [the manifest disregard of the law standard] and openly
look for ways in which to review arbitration awards that appear to be clearly contrary to
law. Indeed, in the courts of the Southern District of New York, which have jurisdiction
over the nation's busiest commercial center, such review is becoming relatively routine.
Second, courts are beginning to acknowledge other non-statutory bases for reviewing
arbitration awards on the grounds of irrationality, public policy, ambiguity or
indefiniteness, arbitrariness or capriciousness, and lack of factual support.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
95. Mr. Stewart, who is general counsel for a securities house, argues for expansion of judicial
review to protect complex substantive rights, absolute defenses to suits, and to deal with punitive
damages. See id. at 367-68. Of course, all of these concerns are those of the brokerage community,
not of individual investors. See also infra note 105 (discussing observations of Poser regarding the
effectiveness of arbitration in the securities industry). Professor Poser has aptly characterized such
complaints as "whining." See Poser, supra note 72, at 1111. However, Mr. Stewart may have a valid
substantive point: if arbitration comes to resemble closely the litigation system it was designed to
replace, a strong argument can be made that enhanced judicial scrutiny should accompany this
transformation in arbitration.
96. See 482 U.S. at 260 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Furthermore, there remains the danger that,
at worst, compelling an investor to arbitrate securities claims puts him in a forum controlled by the
securities industry.") (emphasis added).
97. Justice Blackmun cited the lack of preciseness in the industry definitions of "public" as
opposed to "industry" arbitrators. Id. at 261. These definitions were important because, under the
Uniform Code and SRO rules, a majority of an arbitration panel had to be composed of nonindustry
arbitrators.
98. Of course, the issue of confidence has been a significant concern in the banking industry and
banking law. Without such confidence there looms the ever-present possibility of bank panics and
runs. See MACEY & Mi.R, supra note 24, at 47.
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The actual or perceived partiality of securities arbitration was a
consistent subject of reform after McMahon. The SEC worked with the
SROs to redefine the definitions of "industry" and "public"
arbitrators, particularly eliminating from the latter category
professionals, such as lawyers, a large part of whose work was devoted to
industry clients.99 Moreover, arbitration rules were amended to enhance
disclosure of conflicts of interest by arbitrators to parties.100
However, the SEC and the SROs have not completely solved this
problem of arbitrator partiality. The GAO Report commissioned by
Congress highlighted the need for the SROs to spend more time and
effort in selecting and training their arbitrators. In the GAO's view,
improved selection and training would help dispel the impression by
individual investors that arbitration remains biased in favor of the
securities industry.101 Moreover, the SROs have generally resisted the
use of non-securities industry arbitration fora for investor-broker
disputes, although this use would clearly enhance the perception of
"fairness" of the process. l0 2
Perhaps the most disturbing feature of a bank run is its odd juxtaposition of mass
irrationality with individual rationality. A bank run is in no one's best interest. Even if the
bank has become insolvent, everyone would be better off if closure occurred through an
orderly process in which the bank could maximize the value of its assets rather than
selling them at "fire sale" prices in order to satisfy depositor demands. Nevertheless,
once a bank run begins it is in everyone's individual interest to participate in the run. If
they sit on the sidelines they are sure to lose their savings, but if they join the run they at
least have a chance of recovery.
Id.
99. See Release, supra note 80, at $ 80,101-02.
100. See id. at $ 80,103-04.
101. See GAO REPORT, supra note 82, at 27.
The fairness of arbitration cases, regardless of the forum, depends largely on the
impartiality and competence of individual arbitrators. The primary ways that industry-
sponsored forums can ensure that their arbitration process is as fair as possible are to
select arbitrators with appropriate backgrounds and experience and ensure that they are
trained to know and understand the arbitration process.
Id.
102. See Wallace, supra note 74, at 1235-39 (describing the efforts by some investors to use
arbitration with the American Arbitration Association, a non-securities industry arbitration forum, and
the expertise of this forum in securities law disputes). The GAO REPORT noted that some of the SROs
have encouraged their members to use non-industry arbitration fora. See GAO REPORT, supra note 82,
at 34-35.
This perception by investors of industry bias may be changing. A recent survey of arbitration
participants by the National Association of Securities Dealers reported that three-quarters of such
participants are satisfied with the process. See Most Arbitration Participants Satisfied with Process,
NASD Says, BNA SEc. L. DLY. (Jan. 20, 1995).
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The basis for judicial review and the alleged bias of arbitration
against investors, therefore, particularly concerned Justice Blackmun, as
they had the Wilko Court. He did not dwell on the procedural
differences between arbitration and standard litigation. He
acknowledged these differences and realized that many court procedures
would undermine the speediness of arbitration. Justice Blackmun simply
observed in a footnote that in arbitration, investors lose certain
advantages such as a "wide choice of venue and the extensive
discovery" accompanying court actions. 103  His approach was
compatible with his belief that in the federal securities laws Congress
intended investors to benefit from significant procedural advantages
available in court so as to improve their position in any disputes with the
securities industry. In short, he thought that investors should have the
judicial alternative to pursue their claims; he did not expect arbitration to
become like a trial.
Although I have not spoken to Justice Blackmun about the subject,
he would likely be surprised at what securities arbitration has become
today.104 It is uniformly the view of arbitration experts, and apparent
from a cursory glance at the subject, that arbitration, particularly dealing
with complex cases, increasingly resembles standard litigation.l05
103. 482 U.S. at 259-60 n.18 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
104. The best example of this transformation is the book, SEcuRrriEs ARBITRATION 1994, see sup-
ra note 87, which, as part of the Practicing Law Institute's continuing education program, includes
contributions by leading arbitration practitioners and experts. Many of the articles treat subjects that
one would expect to be major issues for typical litigation: e.g., discovery, legal briefs, motion practice,
use of expert witnesses and cross-examination. On discovery, see George H. Friedman, Discovery in
Arbitration, in 1 SEcuRrrms ARBrrRATION 1994, supra note 87, at 389-90; H. Thomas Fehn et al., In a
New Age of Discovery: Recovery from Discovery, in 1 SEcuirrias ARBrTRATION 1994, supra note 87,
at 589-604. The authors of these articles explain that discovery in arbitration is limited, but that its use
seems to be growing. See id. at 604 ("Arbitration discovery has begun to take on a life of its own. To
the extent that this phenomenon is inimical to the goals of arbitration, it must be controlled."). See also
Theodore A. Krebsbach, Openings, Summations and Legal Briefs, in 1 SEcuRrnEs ARBITRATION 1994,
supra note 87, at 531, 549 ("Briefs should be as short as possible, and only cover the most important
issues."); Shirli Fabbri Weiss & Marvin Greene, Motion Practice and Securities Arbitration, in 1
SECuRITlas ARBITRATION 1994, supra note 87, at 553; Edward B. Horwitz, The Use and Abuse of Expert
Witnesses, in 2 SECURITIEs ARBITRATION 1994, supra note 87, at 349; H. Thomas Fehn et al., Cross-
Examination, Summations and Reasoned Awards, in 1 S Ecurrms ARBrrRATION 1994, supra note 87, at
607. Although the authors are careful to distinguish arbitration procedure from standard litigation, that
these issues matter in arbitration at all suggests the transformation of this process.
105. See, e.g., C. Edward Fletcher III, Learning to Live with the Federal Arbitration Act-
Securities Litigation in a Post-McMahon World, 37 EMORY LJ. 99, 137 (1988).
This is the danger of creeping legalization of securities arbitration. Arbitration runs the
risk of becoming more and more formalized and stylized, of coming more and more
under the intensive scrutiny of legal institutions such as the federal courts and the SEC.
In time, the risk is that the benefits attendant to arbitration-savings in time and
money-will be lost.
Id. (footnote omitted); Poser, supra note 72, at 1105-06.
Since customer-broker arbitration became mandatory, the self-regulatory organizations,
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This increasing procedural complexity of arbitration cannot be laid
upon Justice Blackmun's shoulders. It owes much to complex cultural
factors that transform alternatives to legal systems into the very systems
that they were designed to replace.106 Justice Blackmun might find this
new complexity, as well as the securities industry's calls for increased
judicial oversight of arbitration, somewhat amusing, although he would
not like a joke to be at individual investors' expense. He could now
make the following statement to the McMahon majority: Since your
decision, arbitration has probably not hurt small investors with small
cases,107 but the perception of its "partiality" to the securities industry
remains. 108 It appears that the only way to dispel this perception is to
transform arbitration into a system similar to standard litigation.
Moreover, despite your efforts, securities arbitration continues to
produce cases for federal courts, 109 and this litigation will likely increase
if the securities industry gets its way and courts review more appeals
from arbitration. Doesn't the above suggest that, in 1987, you should
have resisted your judicial activism and left the subject of arbitration of
securities disputes to Congress, which, at the very least, would have had
more resources than you to explore how such arbitration should
develop?
V. CONCLUSION
In this tribute to Justice Blackmun, I have looked at his dissent in
Shearson v. McMahon, a case dealing with the enforcement of pre-
dispute agreements to arbitrate investors' Exchange Act claims. Justice
Blackmun's position there was characterized by his populist suspicion of
large financial institutions and the securities markets and his concern that
at the urging of the SEC, have introduced certain protections comparable to those
routinely provided in civil litigation in the federal courts .... The reforms, however,
raise a question as to whether securities arbitration will continue to offer its special
advantages of speed, economy, privacy and finality. What appears to be emerging is a
compromise between these advantages and the protect[ion of] judicial procedures.
Id.; Stewart, supra note 94, at 349 (footnote omitted) ("With the arbitration process coming to be relied
upon more and more, it is in fact becoming more like the civil litigation system it was designed to
replace."). The increasing complexity of arbitration explains why this quick procedure is losing some
of its speed. See GAO REPORT, supra note 82, at 62 ("The time it took investors to resolve securities
disputes averaged over 1 year at SROs and slightly less than 1 year at [the American Arbitration
Association].").
106. See Fletcher, supra note 105, at 133-37.
107. See GAO REPORT, supra note 82, at 25 ("GAO's analysis of statistical results of decisions in
arbitration cases at both industry-sponsored and independent forums showed no indication of a pro-
industry bias in decisions at industry-sponsored forums.").
108. See id. at 71 ("Individual investors generally described the current system as biased, self-
serving, and not in the best interest of the individual investor.").
109. See Poser. supra note 72, at 1103.
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they ignore the interests of small investors. Moreover, in the dissent
Justice Blackmun showed his annoyance at a majority that, because it was
hostile to private rights of action under Section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act, failed to give appropriate weight to the policy of investor protection
in interpreting both Wilko and the relationship between the Exchange
Act and the Federal Arbitration Act. He also criticized the SEC, which
had become suddenly enamored of the strengths of securities arbitration.
In writing the McMahon dissent, Justice Blackmun highlighted
problems in arbitration that had not significantly changed since Wilko,
but that the McMahon majority ignored. His dissent contributed to the
process whereby the securities industry, Congress, and the SEC tried to
make arbitration more hospitable, and a more trustworthy alternative to
litigation, for individual investors. Many of the problems highlighted by
Justice Blackmun-the preparation of a record and opinions, and
enhancement of arbitrator qualifications, for example-became the main
focus of arbitration reform. So much has arbitration changed, in fact,
that in an ironic result for the McMahon majority, it came increasingly to
resemble the litigation system it was supposed to replace.
The other irony is that arbitration has not kept disputes between
investors and the securities industry out of the courts or the press.
Reports of arbitration disputes continue to appear in the financial
press.110 Moreover, a major case dealing with securities arbitration was
heard this term by the Supreme Court, although a Court absent a
recently retired Justice Blackmun. On Oct. 7, 1994, certiorari was
granted in Mastrobuono v. Lehman.I11 The issue presented is of
significant import to arbitration: -whether a choice-of-law provision in a
brokerage contract prohibits arbitrators from awarding investors punitive
damages. In many typical arbitration contracts, the choice of law clause
refers to the laws of the State of New York. New York law prohibits
arbitrators from awarding punitive damages. However, arbitrators have
awarded these damages in some cases, and courts have upheld them on
110. See, e.g., Michael Siconolfi, Regulators Examine Smith Barney over Limits on Arbitration
Claims, WALL ST. J., at Cl (Dec. 1, 1994) (noting an investigation by SROs into alleged practice by
brokers that bars investors from recovering punitive damages in arbitration and forces investors to go
to court before arbitration for a determination on whether, for statute of limitations reasons, their
claims can proceed); Michael Siconolfi, Bear Stearns Client to Get Damages Award, WALL ST. J., at
C1 (Nov. 9, 1994) (reporting that the arbitration panel ruled that brokerage must pay damages to client
because it sold a stock that its firm was recommending should be "held"); Dave Pettit, Securities
Arbitration Group to Develop Tight Ethics Restrictions on Nonlawyers, WALL ST. J., at A9A (Oct. 17,
1994) (reporting that securities arbitration experts considered placing a ban upon representation of
clients by nonlawyers in securities arbitration and highlighting the increasing "legalization" of
arbitration).
111. 115 S. Ct. 305.
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the basis that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts any state law
restrictions on arbitrators' awards and that the agreement to apply New
York law is limited to New York substantive, not arbitration, law.
The issue is an important one. 112 If nothing else, it again
exemplifies the phenomenon noted by Professor Poser: the securities
industry is content with the "flexibility" of arbitration only when the
results of the process favor the industry. Surely, individual investors,
now relegated to arbitration by the McMahon and Rodriguez majorities,
are likely not to want their primary forum to be one of limited relief. It
is unclear, and hazardous, to predict how the Court will decide
Mastrobuono, but the signs are not good. Justice O'Connor, the author
of McMahon and an advocate of states' rights, no doubt had much to do
with the Court's granting certiorari in this case.1 13
However, things seem to have come full circle. The SEC has filed a
brief in support of the Mastrobuonos because of its concerns about the
rights of individual investors in arbitration.114 It will be interesting to see
112. Professor Katsoris, a specialist on arbitration, argues that in complex arbitration cases,
punitive damages should be allowed, although a complete record of the proceedings should be made
for judicial review purposes. Otherwise, he thinks, investors will feel that they have been relegated to
an inferior forum. See Katsoris, supra note 79, at 602-03.
113. See Alexander Securities v. Mendez, No. 93-1338, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 4272 (June 6, 1994)
(O'Connor, J., dissent from a denial of certiorari). In this dissent in a case similar to Mastrobuono,
Justice O'Connor was joined by the Chief Justice. Although Justice O'Connor simply argued for a grant
of certiorari on the basis of a conflict among state and federal courts on the issue (which conflict is
described in her dissent), one suspects where her sympathies lie. She appears to cite with favor the
lower court decision in Mastrobuono, 20 F.3d 713 (1994), which reversed the award of punitive
damages on the basis that federal law simply sends a case to arbitration but does not otherwise replace
the substantive state law that arbitrators must apply. Such a position might well accord with Justice
O'Connor's position as a strong defender of States' rights.
Perhaps investors may fare well in this case, however. Although it is always difficult to predict
outcomes from oral argument, the reports of the argument in Mastrobuono, held on January 10, 1995,
suggest that Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer are favorable to the investors' position.
See High Court Hears Debate on Award of Punitive Damages in Arbitration, SEc. L. DLY. (BNA Jan.
11, 1995).
114. See SEC Sides with Investor in a Big Securities Case, WALL ST. J., at B2 (Nov. 21, 1994).
The SEC action comes in what is widely considered the most important securities-
arbitration case heard before the Supreme Court since 1987, when a landmark case
required most investors to go to arbitration, rather than court, to settle disputes on Wall
Street. The SEC's stance appears to reflect the agency's increasing concern with the
rights of individual investors, as opposed to an earlier thrust on market regulation,
analysts say.
Id. The Solicitor General has also been granted leave to participate in oral argument. See
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 115 S. Ct. 633,633 (1994).
In its brief filed in support of the Mastrobuonos, see Brief for the United States and the Securities
and Exchange Commission as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Mastrobuono v. Lehman, No. 94-
84, 115 S. Ct. 305 (Nov. 16, 1994), the SEC first argues that NASD Rule 21(0(4) prohibits brokers
from including a provision in a contract that limits the ability of arbitrators to award relief. This Rule,
which has the force of federal law because it has been approved by the SEC, preempts any contrary
state law. Because the Mastrobuonos' contract was formed prior to the effective date of this Rule, the
Rule does not apply in this case. However, the Court should recognize the limited effect of its
decision.
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how a majority (if it is formed to deny investors punitive damage relief)
will be able to ignore now the SEC's views when it relied so much upon
the SEC's position then in McMahon to send investors to arbitration in
the first place. It is a case whose ironies Justice Blackmun would well
have appreciated, and, I think, would have spelled out, were he still on the
Court and were he, as in McMahon, in dissent.ll 5
The other SEC arguments go more to the facts of this case: (i) that the courts overstepped their
reviewing authority in this case in holding that the arbitrator had misconstrued the contract (they
should not review a decision for legal error); (ii) that the arbitral award of punitive damages was in
fact a reasonable reading of the parties' agreement, given that the contract referred both to New York
law and the NASD Rules and especially given the anti-arbitration implication of the New York law
prohibiting arbitrators from awarding punitive damages.
The SEC reconciles its position in this case with that in McMahon by observing that McMahon
will be undermined if arbitration is made more complex and time-consuming by the courts' second-
guessing arbitrator decisions. Moreover, the SEC also suggests that investors' confidence in arbitration
will be shaken if they find that they receive less relief in arbitration than they would in court.
115. As it turned out, Justice Blackmun would not have had to be in dissent in Mastrobuono
(which demonstrates once again the hazards of predicting the outcome of a case before the Court).
While this article was in the editing process, an 8-1 decision written by Justice Stevens, the Court ruled
in favor of the Mastrobuonos. See Mastrobuono v. Lehman, 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995). In offering a
classic demonstration of contract interpretation, the Court read the arbitration agreement at issue both
to incorporate New York substantive law and not to limit an arbitrator's authority to award punitive
damages. It remains to be seen whether brokerage houses will modify arbitration agreements
explicitly to exclude punitive damages relief, an effort that, if attempted, would likely be opposed by
the SEC. See supra note 114.
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